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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : Case No. 20020401-CA 
STACY ANDYAS FRISON, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of distributing, 
offering, or arranging to distribute a controlled substance (cocaine), a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii) (Supp. 2000), in the Third 
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, Judge, presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Does Frison's conviction for distribution fail for insufficient evidence 
where the clear weight of the evidence presented at his bench trial goes against the 
inference of culpable knowledge or intent, or alternatively, under this Court's prerogative 
to reverse a bench trial conviction where it is evident that the trial court made a mistake 
in convicting him despite substantial evidence of his innocence? 
Standard of Review: "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the 
evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is 'against the clear weight 
of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made.1" State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988) 
(quoting State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); citing Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 
[2002] (providing that findings of fact may be set aside when clearly erroneous, and "due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses") (applicable to criminal actions under Utah R.Civ.P. 81(e) [2002]). "[T]his 
standard accords 'appropriate recognition of the relative deference owed multi-member 
panels as opposed to single-judge findings.1 Under this less deferential standard, the 
likelihood that a defendant's conviction will be reversed following a bench trial, as 
opposed to a jury trial, is increased." Id. (citing Walker. 743 P.2d at 193) 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defense counsel challenged the sufficiency of the State's case after the State 
rested. R.166[28-29]. He did not renew the motion at the close of trial after the court 
rendered a verdict. See generally R.166 (Bench Trial Transcript). 
Nonetheless, the sufficiency issue is preserved for appeal. See State v. Larsen, 
2000 UT App 106, n.4, 999 P.2d 1252. Firs t, the trial court made written and oral 
findings of fact and legal conclusions in support of its verdict. R.91-97; 166[54-55]. 
Addendum B. Consequently, "the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has 
made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to 
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amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial." Id. (citing Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(b) (2002) & Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e) (2002)). 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b) (2002) states in relevant part: 
When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, 
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may 
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made 
in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a 
motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b); see also Promax Development Corporation v. Mattson. 943 P.2d 
247,256 (Utah App. 1997) (appellant in civil action "need not have preserved its 
sufficiency claims by specifically raising the issue before the trial court" at bench trial 
proceeding) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b)). 
The rules of civil procedure apply to criminal matters pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
81(e) (2002), which provides: 
(e) Application in Criminal Proceedings. The[] rules of [civil] procedure 
shall also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no 
other applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not 
conflict with any statutory or constitutional requirement. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e). There is no other statutory or constitutional requirement that 
prohibits Frison from raising a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his 
bench trial conviction for distributing, offering, or arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance on appeal. See Larsen, 2000 UT App 106 at n.4 (applying Rule 52(b) to 
criminal appeal pursuant to Rule 81(e)). 
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Further, in reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, [the Court of 
Appeals] determine^] if each element of the charged offenses is supported 
by the required quantum of evidence. [So long as] the trial court, in finding 
defendant guilty of the charged offenses, made findings and conclusions 
regarding each element, defendant's claims are preserved. 
Larsen, 2000 UT App 106 at n.4. 
Under Larsen, this Court may review the findings and conclusions made by the 
trial court to determine whether the evidence sufficiently supports the conviction for 
distributing, offering, or arranging to distribute a controlled substance. Id; R.91-97; 
166[54-55] (Trial Court Findings and Conclusions). The fact that defense counsel did 
not renew his sufficiency challenge after the court rendered its verdict does not preclude 
this Court from determining the issue on appeal. Pursuant to Rule 52(b), this Court has 
jurisdiction since the trial court below made findings and conclusions appropriate for 
review on appeal. See Larsen. 2000 UT App 106 at n.4; R.91-97; 166[54-55]. 
STATUTORY PROVISION 
The following statute is determinative of the issue on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2000) - Distributing, Agreeing, 
Consenting, Offering, or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled or 
Counterfeit Substance: 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: (a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it 
is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally:... (ii) distribute 
a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange 
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
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Appellant Stacy Andyas Frison ("Frison") was charged by amended information 
with two counts of unlawful distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance (cocaine), one a first degree felony because it occurred 
in a public park and the other a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)(Supp.2000). R.50-52. An arrest warrant issued. R.l. The case was 
bound over after a preliminary hearing on both counts. R.21-22. 
Frison waived his right to a jury trial. R.66-67,163[4]. The case was tried at a 
bench trial. R.72-73. The State presented a single witness, Officer Shawn Player 
("Player"). R.166[4-27]. At the close of the State's case, Frison moved to dismiss both 
charges for insufficient evidence. R.166[28-29]. The court denied the motion on the 
basis that the State presented sufficient evidence under an accomplice liability theory 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999). R.166[29]. The court, however, noted 
that the State's case was "weak." R. 166[29]. 
Frison presented his own witness, Gary Leonard Moore ("Moore"). R.166[30-
44]. Frison did not renew the motion to dismiss after Moore's testimony. See generally 
R.166. 
Frison was acquitted of the first degree felony distribution charge which allegedly 
occurred in a public park. R.72-73. He was convicted of the second degree felony 
distribution charge. R.72-73. Frison was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 1-15 
years in prison. R.l 13-14. He timely appeals his conviction. R.l 18 (Notice of Appeal); 
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123 (Amended Notice of Appeal). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Officer Shawn Player ("Player"), an undercover agent for the Salt Lake City 
Police Department, conducted two undercover drug buys in the summer of 2000. 
R.166[4-7]. He was dressed in disheveled, dirty clothes, had long hair and a beard, and 
used the alias of "Jimmy." R.166[6,36]. 
Player testified that on July 6, 2000, he and a confidential informant arranged to 
buy drugs from Gary Moore ("Moore"). R.166[8-10]. Player and the informant met 
Frison and Moore at Sears on 800 South Main Street in Salt Lake City. R.166[8]. Frison 
drove the car in which he and Moore arrived. R.166[9]. Player gave some money to the 
informant in the presence of Moore and Frison. IdL The informant purchased cocaine 
from Moore. Id. Player testified that Frison seemed nervous and suspicious, and 
appeared to be checking out Player for wires or weapons. R. 166[ 10]. Frison was never 
charged with this alleged drug deal. R. 166[ 11]. 
A few hours later, Player made arrangements for another drug deal. R.166[l 1]. 
Player called Moore and indicated that he wanted to buy more cocaine. Id Moore 
directed him to meet them at a convenience store on 1300 South 900 West. R.166[12]. 
Player went to the convenience store and waited in his truck in the parking lot. Id 
He noticed a Chevrolet Impala parked across the street with the hood up. IcL It was the 
same car that he saw Frison driving at the earlier buy. Id, Frison was looking under the 
6 
hood. R.166[ 13]. According to Player, Frison saw Player in his truck in the convenience 
store parking lot. R.166[ 13]. Frison looked around, shut the hood, scanned the area, 
then got in his car. Id. Frison drove across the street and pulled into the convenience 
store parking lot next to Player's truck. IcL Player looked at Moore, who rode as a 
passenger in Frisonfs car. Id. Moore said, "follow us." Id. 
Player followed the car to Jordan Park. R.166[ 14]. Frison stopped and Player 
parked about three car lengths behind them. R.92,166[ 14]. Moore exited the car and got 
in Player's truck. R.166[14]. Player gave More fifty dollars. IdL Moore gave Player 
crack cocaine then exited the truck. R.166[14-15]. Moore got back into Frison's car and 
the two men drove away. R.166[15]. Frison was charged with first degree felony 
distribution based on this set of alleged facts. R.50-52. 
Player called Moore again on July 10,2000, to arrange to "buy another fifty." 
R.166[15]. Moore instructed Player to meet him at the Sears parking lot. Id. Player 
went to Sears and sat on a retaining wall awaiting Moore. IdL He saw Frison pull up in 
a different car than he drove before. Id. Moore, who sat in the front passenger seat, 
motioned Player to come to him. R.166[ 16,24]. Player got into the back seat of the car 
behind Moore. R.166[16]. Another man named Lance sat in the back seat behind 
Frison. Id Player recognized Lance from police photos. R.166[23]. 
Moore placed his left arm across the front bench seat and dropped his hand 
downward, revealing a twist of cocaine. R.92,166[16]. Player asked, "it was fifty, 
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right?" R.166[16]. Moored confirmed it was. Id. Moore took the cocaine from Moore 
and placed money in his hand. R.166[ 17]. Moore then brought his hand over the seat. 
Id. Player testified that he directed his statement to Moore. R.166[27]. He believed that 
Frison overheard the conversation and understood "it was fifty, right?" to refer to drugs. 
R.166[26-27]. Player was not certain, however, that Frison actually understood it that 
way. R.166[27]. 
During the exchange, Moore and Player primarily discussed the possibility of 
employment for Moore at a company that Player supposedly owned. R.166[ 17,26]. 
They also discussed an apartment for Moore. R.92. Frison did not participate in the 
conversation. R.166[17]. 
According to Player, Frison was looking side-to-side and up-and-down the lot and 
seemed to be scanning the area. R.166[17-18]. Frison drove the car approximately 30 to 
40 feet slowly through the parking lot during the transaction. R.166[ 18,24]. Player 
testified that the parking lot was either 2/3 - 3/4 full or entirely full. R.166[18,25]. 
Player did not take notice of the traffic in the lot and conceded that Frison could have 
been avoiding collisions with other cars. R.166[25]. Frison stopped the car without any 
direction from Moore. R.166[18]. At that point, Player exited the car and Frison drove 
off. R.166[18]. 
Moore testified for the defense. R.166[30-44]. Moore was not represented by an 
attorney during his testimony at Frison's trial. R.166[33-34]. The trial court informed 
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him that he was entitled to an attorney since he may be incriminating himself. Id. Moore 
indicated he understood his rights, but agreed to waive them at Frison's trial. Id. 
Moore previously pled to a second degree felony concerning his involvement in 
the alleged deals. R.92. He explained that he and Frison are friends and related by 
marriage. R.166[30,42]. 
Moore testified that Frison was not involved in the drug transaction with Player. 
R.166[31-32]. Moreover, he never discussed the deals with Frison. R.166[35]. He 
convinced Frison to give him rides on the false pretense that he was looking for an 
apartment and a job, and needed to go certain places. R.166[34]. Moore explained that 
"[h]e [would] take me where I needed to go, I got out and do what I had to do, got back 
in [the car] and left." R.166[35]. 
Moore claimed he did not remember meeting Player on July 6,2000. R.166[37-
38]. He did not remember a time when Frison was parked across the street from a 
convenience store with his hood up. R.166[39]. He did not remember driving across the 
street to meet Player or telling him to follow them to Jordan Park. R. 166[37-39]. He did 
not remember walking from Frison's car to Player's truck or selling Player fifty dollars 
worth of cocaine. R.166[39-40]. He also claimed he did not recognize Player in the 
court room and testified that he had never seen him before. R.166[40]. 
Moore similarly claimed he did not remember a drug deal that occurred on July 
10, 2000. R.166[40]. Although he recalled a time when he rode in a care with Frison 
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and Lance, and that he rode in the front seat while Frison drove, he did not remember 
pulling into a Sears parking lot. R.166[41]. 
The parties stipulated that the identity of the drugs at issue was cocaine. 
R.166[45-46]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Frison's bench trial conviction for distributing, offering, or arranging to distribute 
a controlled substance fails for insufficient evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2000). The clear weight of the evidence goes against a reasonable 
inference of his culpable knowledge or intent. See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 
(Utah 1988); State v. Hester. 2000 UT App 159, 3 P.3d 725; Sta te v. Clark. 783 P.2d 68 
(Utah App. 1989); State v. Gallegos. 851 P.2d 1185 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Gray. 
717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986); State v. Layman. 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911. Indeed, Moore 
testified that Frison was not involved in the drug deals and that he unwittingly drove 
Moore around so that Moore could conduct the deals himself. Additionally, the State's 
own witness established that the deals only concerned Moore and that Frison was not 
involved in any way with the actual sales. 
Alternatively and for the same reasons, notwithstanding the insufficiency of the 
evidence, this Court should reverse the conviction since it is clearly evident that the trial 
court mistakenly convicted Frison of distributing, offering, or arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance. See Goodman. 763 P.2d at 786-87. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: THE DISTRIBUTION CONVICTION FAILS FOR 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WHERE THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT FRISON' S BENCH TRIAL GOES 
AGAINST A REASONABLE INFERENCE OF CULPABLE 
KNOWLEDGE OR INTENT: ALTERNATIVELY. THIS COURT 
SHOULD REVERSE THE CONVICTION SINCE THE TRIAL COURT 
MADE A MISTAKE IN CONVICTING FRISON DESPITE STRONG 
EVIDENCE OF HIS INNOCENCE. 
The trial court's guilty verdict on the charge of distributing, offering, or arranging 
to distribute a controlled substance fails for insufficient evidence where it goes against 
the clear weight of the evidence presented at Frison's bench trial. See State v. Goodman, 
763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988) (bench trial verdict fails for insufficient evidence where 
conviction goes against clear weight of evidence") (quotation and citations omitted). 
Specifically, the evidence does not legally support the inference of Frison's culpable 
knowledge or intentional involvement in the drug deals conducted by Moore. See, State 
v. Hester. 2000 UT App 159, f 13, 3 P.3d 725 (holding that State failed to present 
sufficient quantum of evidence of defendant's intent to arrange drug sale) (Bench, J., 
dissenting). 
Alternatively and for the same reason, Frison's conviction should be reversed 
under this Court's prerogative to do so when it appears that the trial court mistakenly 
convicted the defendant. See Goodman, 763 P.2d at 786 (allowing appellate court to 
reverse bench trial conviction when it "reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made"). 
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In order to convict Frison of distributing, offering, or arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance, the judge had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
"knowingly and intentionally . . . distribute[d] a controlled or counterfeit substance, or 
agree[d], consented], offer[ed], or arrangefd] to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii); see also U.S. Const, amend. V & XIV 
(due process); Utah Const, art. I, § 7 (due process); In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 363 
(1970) (holding that beyond-reasonable-doubt standard is fundamental to due process). 
The evidence fully marshaled in a light most favorable to the bench trial verdict is 
as follows: 
- Frison drove Moore on three occasions to locations where Moore sold cocaine to 
an undercover agent named Player. R.166[4-7,9,13-17,45-46]. 
- On the first buy, which occurred July 6, 2000, Frison drove Moore to the Sears 
department store located at 800 South State Street. R.166[8-9]. Player gave some 
money to a confidential informant present during the buy. R.166[9]. The informant 
purchased cocaine from Moore. Id Player testified that Frison seemed nervous and 
suspicious, and appeared to be checking out Player for wires or weapons. R.166[10]. 
- Player called Moore later the same day to arrange another drug buy. R.166[l 1]. 
Moore directed Player to meet him at a convenience store located at 1300 South 900 
West. R.166[12]. Player drove up to the convenience store and saw Frison across the 
street working on his car with the hood up. IcL When Frison saw Player, he looked 
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around, shut the hood, scanned the area, and then got in his car. R.166[13]. He and 
Moore, riding in Frison's car, drove to the convenience store and parked next to Player. 
Id. Moore told Player to follow them to Jordan Park. R.166[13-14]. Frison stopped the 
car and Moore exited. R. 166[ 14]. Moore walked over to Player's truck, parked about 
three car lengths behind them. R.92,166[ 14]. Moore got in Player's truck, Player gave 
Moore fifty dollars, and Moore gave Player cocaine. R.166[14-15]. Moore got back in 
Frison's car and the two men drove away. R.166[15]. 
- The third buy occurred on July 10, 2000. R.166[ 15]. Player called Moore to 
arrange to "buy another fifty." R. 166[ 15]. Per Moore's instructions, Player met Moore 
back at the Sears parking lot. Id Player saw Frison pull up in his car with Moore in the 
front passenger seat. R.166[15-16]. Moore motioned for Player to come over. 
R.166[24]. Player got into the back seat of Frison's car. R.166[16]. Another man named 
Lance was also in the back seat. Id Player recognized Lance from police department 
photos. R.166[23]. 
- Moore reached across the bench seat and let his hand drop behind the seat, 
revealing a twist of cocaine. R.92,166[ 16]. Player asked, "it was fifty, right?" 
R.166[16]. Moore confirmed that it was. R.166[16]. Player took the twist and put 
money in Moore's hand. R.166[ 17]. Frison overheard the verbal exchange between 
Moore and Player. R.166[26-27]. Player testified that he believed Frison understood the 
phrase, "it was fifty, right?" to refer to drugs. Id. 
13 
- According to Player, Frison was looking side-to-side and up-and-down the lot 
and seemed to be scanning the area. R.166[17-18]. Frison drove the car approximately 
30 to 40 feet slowly through the parking lot during the transaction. R.166[ 18,24]. Frison 
stopped the car without any direction from Moore. R.166[18]. At that point, Player 
exited the car and Frison drove off. R.166[18]. 
- Moore pled to a second degree felony concerning his involvement in the alleged 
deals. R.92. He explained that he and Frison are friends related by marriage. 
R.166[30,42]. Moore testified that Frison was not involved in the drug deal with Player 
and that he never discussed the deals with Frison. R.166[31-32,35]. Moore admitted 
that he lied to Frison to get him to drive him to the various locations where the drug deals 
occurred, claiming that he needed a ride to look for an apartment and a job. R. 166[34]. 
- Moore testified that Frison was not involved in the drug transaction with Player. 
R.166[31-32]. Moreover, he never discussed the deals with Frison. R.166[35]. He 
convinced Frison to give him rides on the false pretense that he was looking for an 
apartment and a job, and needed to go certain places. R.166[34]. Moore explained that 
"[h]e [would] take me where I needed to go, I got out and do what I had to do, got back 
in [the car] and left." R.166[35]. 
- However, Moore claimed that he did not remember any of the specific deals that 
occurred. Moore claimed he did not remember meeting Player on July 6, 2000. 
R.166[37-38]. He did not remember a time when Frison was parked across the street 
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from a convenience store with his hood up. R.166[39]. He did not remember driving 
across the street to meet Player or telling him to follow them to Jordan Park. R. 166[37-
39]. He did not remember walking from Frison's car to Player's truck or selling Player 
fifty dollars worth of cocaine. R.166[39-40]. He also claimed he did not recognize 
Player in the court room and testified that he had never seen him before. R. 166[40]. 
Moore similarly claimed he did not remember a drug deal that occurred on July 10, 2000. 
R.166[40]. Although he recalled a time when he rode in a care with Frison and Lance, 
and that he rode in the front seat while Frison drove, he did not remember pulling into a 
Sears parking lot. R.166[41]. 
As an initial matter, the trial court's verdict goes against the clear weight of the 
evidence because the evidence presented does not establish Frison's culpable knowledge 
or intentional involvement of the drug sales that Moore conducted. See. Hester. 2000 UT 
App 159 at [^13 (holding that State failed to present sufficient quantum of evidence of 
defendant's intent to arrange drug sale). "Intent to commit a crime can be 'inferred from 
the actions of the defendant or from surrounding circumstances.'" Id, at ^ Jl 1 (quoting 
State v. Murphv. 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah 1983)). 
Under this rule of law, convictions for distribution pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) have historically been upheld only in cases where there was much more 
compelling evidence of culpable knowledge or intent than is present here. For example, 
in Hester, this Court held that there was insufficient evidence to support a bindover on a 
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distribution charge where the evidence did not legally support the inference of intent. 
2000 UT App 159 at ^[13. The defendant in that case was solicited by an undercover 
agent for "'chiva,'" also known as heroin. IdL at [^2. The agent was in a car. Id The 
defendant, standing on the sidewalk, approached the car and said, "'No, baby, I don't[;] 
only coke.'" Id. (alteration original). The agent responded that she wanted heroine, but 
she would take cocaine and offered defendant twenty dollars. Id, The defendant took 
the money, told the agent to wait, and walked away. Id The defendant was arrested a 
block away, still walking. Id at ^3. He did not have cocaine on him, spoke to no one 
along the way, nor made any phone calls subsequent to speaking to the agent. Id He 
also made no indication that he was actually going to a supplier or was otherwise 
attempting to procure cocaine. Id. 
In holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a bindover on the 
distribution charge, this Court reasoned that a defendant charged with distribution must 
"commitf] some 'act in furtherance of an arrangement' to distribute controlled 
substances." Id at TJ10 (quoting State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1979)). 
However, the mere "offer to sell drugs with no actual intent of following through" did 
not constitute arranging. Id. at ^10 (citation omitted). 
The Court also noted the lack of circumstantial evidence that supported an 
inference of intent either by a completed sale or active steps in furtherance thereof. Id. at 
1111-14. 
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Hester's true intentions that evening may never be known. Rather than 
allowing events to unfold a while longer, the police moved too quickly to 
apprehend Hester without even knowing if he had any controlled 
substances on him (he did not), or if any other party was involved in the 
transaction (none was identified), or if he had some other means to get the 
cocaine delivered to [the agent] (none was shown). On the record before 
us, trying to discern Hester's intentions at the time of his arrest would be an 
exercise in pure speculation. 
Li at H14. 
The Court went on to explain that the fact finder is allowed to draw only 
"reasonable inference[s]." Id. at ^ 15. "While it is sometimes subtle, there is in fact a 
difference between drawing a reasonable inference and merely speculating about the 
possibilities." Id. at ^16. "'When the correlation between the predicate facts and the 
conclusion is slight, then the inference is less reasonable, and 'at some point, the link 
between the facts and the conclusion becomes so tenuous that we call it 'speculation.'"" 
Id. at %\1 (quotations omitted). In short, the Court concluded that '"[a]n inference must 
be based on probability and not on mere possibilities or on surmise or conjecture.'" Id at 
[^20 (quotation omitted). 
In State v. Clark. 783 P.2d 68 (Utah App. 1989), this Court affirmed a distribution 
conviction given substantial evidence that undercut the defendant's claim that he was not 
involved in the drug deals that occurred in that case. Id, at 70. There, an undercover 
agent went to a house based on a confidential tip that a resident named Hicks was 
trafficking in cocaine. Id. at 69. Defendant was present at the house. Id Defendant told 
the agent that the cocaine was '"extremely good'" and said he and Hicks were partners. 
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Id. Defendant testified at trial that he was actually an undercover agent himself and he 
made the statements to keep his cover. Id 
Defendant attempted to phone a drug contact named Johnson at Hicks request. Id 
Johnson could not be located, so the agent and Hicks went to the Johnson residence, 
while defendant went to a bar to find him. Id Unable to locate Johnson at the bar, 
defendant joined Hicks and the agent at Johnson's residence. Id "[D]etails of an 
agreed-upon cocaine transaction were [discussed] in his presence." Id The agent 
observed a slight handshake between defendant and Johnson's wife after the meeting 
adjourned. Id 
After the meeting, defendant asked Hicks if he saw defendant give Johnson's wife 
cocaine. Id Enroute from Johnson's house, defendant alerted the agent that they were 
being followed by a car driven by a narcotics agent. Id The proposed drug deal 
discussed at the Johnson house ultimately never transpired. Id A subsequent search of 
defendant's house revealed paraphernalia. Id Hicks had told the agent, after he was 
arrested, that the paraphernalia was at defendant's house. Id 
In upholding the defendant's conviction for distribution, this Court noted his 
"incriminating statements to [the agent], his presence during the cocaine sale 
negotiations, his attempts to contact [] Johnson, and his warning of a tailing car." Id at 
70: see also State v. Gallegos. 851 P.2d 1185, 1189-91 (Utah App. 1993) (sufficient 
evidence of distribution where defendant participated in five separate phone calls where 
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he indicated he could get the caller(s) marijuana or cocaine); State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 
1313, 1320-21 (Utah 1986) (sufficient evidence of distribution where defendant and co-
defendant were both involved in drug transactions, defendant was present or drove co-
defendant to locations where transactions occurred, defendant divided cocaine and gave 
it to agent and extolled its quality to agent). 
Unlike the aforementioned cases, there is not a compelling, legally sound 
inference between the evidence and Frison's culpable knowledge or intent. In fact, as in 
Hester, "on the record [for appeal], trying to discern [Frison's] intentions at the time of 
[the drug deals] would be an exercise in pure speculation." Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at 
Tfl4. Accordingly, there is an even more compelling reason to reverse Frison's 
conviction if a similar paucity of evidence was not enough to even support the bindover 
at issue in Hester. 
First, the evidence establishes that Frison was not involved in the drug deals 
beyond unknowingly providing a taxi service for Moore. Frison was ignorant of the drug 
deals that were going on as he drove Moore from place to. In fact, Moore admitted that 
Frison did not know anything about the drug deals. R.166[31-32]. In addition, Moore 
explained that he lied to Frison about his desire to look for an apartment and a job to get 
Frison to drive him around.1 R.166[34]. 
1
 Moore made incredible claims that he did not remember the specifics of the drug 
deals that he conducted with Player, which is understandable considering his desire to 
keep himself out of additional legal trouble. He had already pled to a second degree 
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Player similarly testified unequivocally that he only dealt with and spoke to Moore 
during each of the exchanges. For instance, Player contacted Moore alone to arrange 
each of the buys. R.166[8-l 1,15]. Moore gave all the directions to Player, including 
instructions to meet him at either the convenience store, Jordan Park or Sears. R. 166[ 12-
13,15]. Similarly, Player testified that Moore alone was the one who actually transacted 
the deals and took affirmative steps to make them happen, such as actually exchanging 
cocaine for money with the confidential informant, R.166[9]; exiting the car in Jordan 
Park and entering Player's truck to conduct the sale in that instance, R.166[14-15]; and 
motioning to, conversing with and handing Player the drugs during the second sale that 
occurred in the Sear's parking lot. R.166[ 16,17]. In all the deals, Moore alone accepted 
money for the drugs that were sold. R.166[9,14,17]. 
By contrast, Frison was disengaged from the activity surrounding the deals; he 
was not actively involved in the same way that the defendants were in Clark, Gray, and 
Gallegos. For instance, the State did not present any testimony that Frison conversed 
felony and likely did not want to risk further possible legal ramifications by expounding 
under oath as to the extent of his involvement. The fact that he testified at Frison's trial 
without his own attorney present sheds even more light on his reluctance to divulge too 
much information. R.166[33-34]. Absent legal counsel, he had no way to know what 
could be used against him later. 
Nonetheless, Moore had no reason to lie concerning Frison's lack of knowledge. 
If anything, Moore could gain by implicating Frison to the extent that he could vindicate 
himself in some measure and possibly gain favor with the Board of Pardons in terms of 
sentencing and an early parole release date. Consequently, Moore's testimony 
concerning Frison's lack of knowledge is credible evidence whose weight goes against 
the trial court's guilty verdict. See Goodman, 763 P.2d at 786. 
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with Player about any topic, let alone drugs. See generally R. 166. At most, Frison 
overheard Player say to Moore on one occasion, "it was fifty, right?" R.166[26-27]. 
However, nothing in the statement itself directly references drugs, and Frison did not 
otherwise respond to the comment in such a way as to indicate he was privy to its 
meaning. Cf Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at \2 (agent asked defendant if he had "'chiva;'" 
defendant directly responded to agent by saying, "'[n]o, baby, I donft[;] only coke.1"); 
Gallegos, 851 P.2d at 1190 (defendant himself used code phrases denoting drugs, such as 
"'smoke1", "'an elbow1", "'white'", "'a little half", "'gamer'" and "'green paper'" in his 
conversations with buyers). Indeed, as Player admitted at trial, there is nothing to verify 
that Frison understood the meaning of the phrase at all. R.166[27]. 
Moreover, Player's testimony does not indicate that he ever conversed directly 
with Frison. See generally R.166. Rather, during the third buy at Sears, he directed his 
statement, "it was fifty, right?" to Moore, as well as the rest of the conversation 
concerning an apartment and job for Moore. R.92,166[ 17,26-27]; cf Clark. 783 P.2d at 
68-70 (defendant conversed with undercover agent specifically about drug buys that 
were currently underway and describe the cocaine as "'extremely good5"); Gray, 717 
P.2d at 1321 (defendant actively talked up the drug's quality to undercover agent). 
There is no evidence that Frison accepted money, relayed drugs, or was in 
possession of the drugs that were sold. See generally R.166; cf Gray, 717 P.2d at 1321 
(during drug sale defendant "divided cocaine and gave it to" undercover agent). He did 
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not accept phone calls on behalf of Moore or otherwise participate in arranging the deals 
by giving directions, instructions, or any information to Player. See generally R.166; cf. 
Gajlegos, 851 P.2d at 1190 (defendant partook in telephone conversations where he 
offered caller(s) marijuana and cocaine); Clark, 783 P.2d at 69 (defendant warned 
undercover agent that they were being followed by another driven by narcotics officer). 
Although Player testified that Frison appeared to be acting as a lookout during the 
buys, such evidence does not legally support the inference of intent or knowledge in light 
of Hester and the overall weakness of the State's case against him. The defendant in 
Hester behaved in much more overtly suspect ways than Frison, yet this Court reversed 
the bindover order. See supra (discussing facts of Hester). Unlike Hester, however, 
Frison did not converse with Player about drugs, take money, and walk off with it under 
the pretense that he would facilitate a drug buy. See Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at <[fl[ 2-3. 
Frison's behavior is much more analogous to that of the defendant in State v. 
Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911. In tha t case, the defendant, convicted of drug 
possession under a constructive possession theory, was stopped with a woman who was 
found to be in possession of drugs. Id at.... When the police officer asked the woman if 
he could search her pouch which concealed the drugs, the woman looked over to 
defendant. IcL at [^16. Defendant "shook his head in a negative fashion" in response to 
her. Id Nonetheless, the Utah Supreme Court, affirming this Court's decision, held that 
the defendant's behavior, suspect as it was, did not support an inference of culpable 
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intent or knowledge to sustain the possession conviction. IdL at ^ fl6. 
The only fact tending to prove [defendant's] control over [the woman] is 
that she looked at him when the deputy requested to see the pouch and that 
[defendant] shook his head in a negative fashion. This simply is not 
enough. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
As in Layman, Frison's alleged behavior as a lookout "simply is not enough" to 
support the inference that he acted with culpable knowledge and intent. Id Indeed, even 
Player admitted that Frison's actions during the third buy at Sears may have been due to 
Frison's effort to avoid traffic and parked cars in the parking lot. R.166[25]. While such 
behavior may in fact have a deeper significance, there is no way to know beyond mere 
speculation what it meant under the circumstances of this case. See Hester, 2000 UT 
App. 159 at ^ [14 ("Hester's true intentions that evening may never be known"); Layman, 
1999UT79atK16. 
In fact, it just as likely has an innocent explanation. It is not uncommon for 
people to scan parking lots as they drive through them to keep an eye out for other cars 
coming from unexpected directions and cutting across lanes. It is similarly common for 
people to be looking under the hood of their car while waiting in a parking lot, especially 
if the car is old and prone to breaking down. And if Frison was told by Moore that he 
was waiting for Player because Player was going to help him look for an apartment and 
job, then Frison would naturally keep an eye out for him as he waited with Moore. 
Alternatively and for the same reasons discussed above, Frison's conviction 
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should be reversed under this Court's prerogative to do so when it appears that the trial 
court mistakenly convicted the defendant. See Goodman, 763 P.2d at 786 (allowing 
appellate court to reverse bench trial conviction when it "reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made"). The clear weight of the evidence establishes 
that Frison did not know that the drug deals were occurring and that he unwittingly drove 
Moore around under the pretense that Moore needed the rides to look for an apartment 
and a job. See supra. Even Player's testimony establishes that Frison was not involved to 
the extent that he never spoke with Frison about drugs and never received drugs from 
Frison. Id, Rather, the drug transactions occurred only with Moore, and Moore was the 
only person directing them, providing the drugs, and accepting the money. IdL 
Consequently, it is evident that the trial court made a mistake in finding Frison guilty of 
the distribution charge. See Goodman, 763 P.2d at 768. Accordingly, this Court has a 
basis to reverse the conviction notwithstanding the sufficiency issue. Id. at 787 (u[e]ven 
if the clear weight of the evidence supports the verdict, however, this Court will reverse 
if it otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, thus 
providing the defendant an additional opportunity to obtain a reversal"). 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Frison respectfully requests this Court to reverse his 
conviction for distributing, offering, or arranging to distribute a controlled substance. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii). 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
STACY ANDYAS FRISON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 001918175 FS 
JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
This matter came on for bench trial on the 17th day of September 2001, before this 
Court, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, and District Judge, presiding. Kelly R. Sheffield, 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney, represented the State. Roy D. Cole represented the 
defendant. The defendant was present. The Court, after hearing the testimony at trial and 
for good cause shown, makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. By stipulated motion, the parties agreed that the substances involved in the 
case were in fact cocaine, with a total amount of 460 milligrams. 
2. By stipulated motion, the parties agreed that the sole issue for the trial court to 
determine was whether the defendant, Stacy Andyas Frison, by his actions 
was a party to the offense, and did thereby knowingly and intentionally 
distribute or offer, agree, consent or arrange to distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(l)(a)(ii), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
3. The State's first and only witness was Officer Sean Player of the Salt Lake 
City Police Department. He testified that on at least two separate occasions 
1 
the defendant was the driver of a vehicle out of which he purchased drugs. On 
July 6, 2000, after placing a cell phone call, Officer Player was instructed to 
meet the defendants at a market near 1300 South and 900 West. As Officer 
Player arrived, he noticed the defendant walking around his car with the hood 
raised. After Officer Player parked at the market, he noticed the defendant 
obviously looking around for anyone who may have been following Officer 
Player. After a period of time the defendant walked to the front of the car and 
still looking around, closed the hood, got into his car, and drove to Officer 
Player's location. 
4. The passenger/co-defendant in this case (who earlier pled guilty to a second 
degree felony) then told Officer Player to follow them. Officer Player 
followed them to Jordan Park. When the defendant stopped his vehicle, 
Officer Player stopped about three car lengths behind. The passenger/co-
defendant then exited the defendant's vehicle, walked back to Officer Player's 
vehicle and got in. The passenger/co-defendant then sold Officer Player a 
rock of cocaine for $50.00. The passenger/co-defendant then returned to the 
defendant's vehicle and got in. The defendant then drove away. 
5. On July 10, 2000 Officer Player again placed a cell phone call to the co-
defendants for more cocaine. He was instructed to drive to the Sears parking 
lot at State Street and 800 South. Officer Player was sitting on the retaining 
wall when the defendant, in a different car, drove up and stopped. Officer 
Player was instructed to get in the rear passenger side seat. Officer Player 
complied. The defendant, Stacy Andyas Frison, was driving. Passenger/co-
defendant Gary Lenard Moore was in the front passenger seat and 
passenger/co-defendant Lanz Harwell was in the seat directly behind the 
defendant. The defendant then began to slowly drive to the other end of the 
parking lot, while keeping a lookout by shifting and rotating his head. A very 
brief conversation ensued between Officer Player and the front passenger/co-
defendant. During this conversation, the front passenger/co-defendant 
mentioned that he would like to work for Officer Player's company. The front 
passenger/co-defendant then extended his left arm and his clinched fist toward 
the defendant driver, placing his arm on the top of the seat. He then released 
his clinched fingers, downward, displaying another rock of cocaine. Officer 
Player then stated loud enough for all in the car to hear "This is fifty right?" 
He then placed the money in the passenger/co-defendant's hand. The 
defendant then stopped his vehicle, now at the other end of the Sears parking 
lot, and Officer Player exited. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant having been represented and informed by counsel, and having 
waived his right to trial by jury, has elected to have this case tried to the 
bench. 
? 
2. Based on the evidence offered and the totality of the circumstances, Count I, 
the first-degree felony, is hereby dismissed. The sale of the drugs was not 
performed in the same vehicle as the defendant and there is no evidence that 
the defendant was aware of the drug sale, which admittedly took place in a 
separate vehicle. Therefore, the defendant is found Not Guilty of Count I in 
the Amended Information. 
3. Based on the evidence offered the defendant is found Guilty of Count II, the 
second-degree felony of the Amended Information. 
4. Someone (Officer Player) did get into the vehicle owned and driven by the 
defendant. 
5. The testimony of the officer is found to be credible. The defendant had been 
present at earlier drug sales. The defendant heard the term or phrases "This is 
fifty, right?" And then, clearly, something was passed from one person to the 
other. Defendant heard words that would alert any normal person to the fact 
that some transaction was taking place in his vehicle. 
6. The totality of these circumstances establish that the defendant knew that a 
controlled substance was being exchanged. 
7. It is certain that, at the time in question, the defendant and his passengers were 
not looking for an apartment or a job. 
8. A meeting was arranged, and the defendant was participating in that meeting. 
9. The defendant did not set up the deal. 
10. The defendant did not take the money. 
11. The defendant did not give the drugs. 
12. The evidence has shown beyond any reasonable doubt, that the defendant 
knew what was occurring and assisted in the unlawful distribution, offering, 
agreeing, consenting, or arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance. The defendant did this by driving the vehicle, by keeping a look-
out and by not interfering with the actual transaction. 
DATED this — '' day of October 2001. 
Roy. D. Cole Attorney for Defendant 
Approved as to form and content 
BY TH^ COURT 
HONORABLE LESSLIE A.lEWIS 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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ROY D. COLE 
Attorney for Defendant 
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Kelly R. Sheffield, 5869 
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Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
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Case No. 001918175 FS 
JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
This matter came on for bench trial, on the 17th day of September 2001, before the 
Court, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, and District Judge, presiding. Kelly R. 
Sheffield, Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney, represented the State. Roy D. Cole 
represented the defendant. The defendant was present. 
After hearing testimony and reviewing the evidence the Court issued the 
following judgment and order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED JUDGED AND DECREED 
1. The defendant is found Not Guilty of Count I of the State's criminal 
Information, and it was dismissed. 
2. The defendant is found Guilty of Count II of the State's criminal 
Information as charged. 
3. After further discussion on the record regarding the defendant's status, the 
Court shall take the defendant into custody pending sentencing. 
4. The defendant, through counsel, waives his maximum time for sentencing, 
and a pre-sentence report is ordered through Adult Probation and Parole. 
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